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Abstract
This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between civil wars and
international trade. We first show that trade destruction due to civil wars
is very large and persistent and increases with the severity of the conflict.
We then identify two effects that trade can have on the risk of civil conflicts:
it may act as a deterrent if trade gains are put at risk during civil wars but
it may also act as an insurance if international trade provides a substitute
to internal trade during civil wars. We find support for the presence of
these two mechanisms and conclude that trade openness may deter the
most severe civil wars (those that destroy the largest amount of trade) but
may increase the risk of lower scale conflicts.
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1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, democratization and increased integration in
the world economy have often been advocated in order to promote prosperity
and peace in poor countries. In this paper, we focus on the relation between
international trade and civil wars, an endemic form of violence in poor countries,
(see Collier and Rohner 2008, for an analysis of the effect of democracy on the
risk of civil wars). We identify two possible mechanisms relating international
trade and civil wars: deterrence and insurance. While the first effect is such that
trade openness lowers the risk of civil wars, the second one works in the opposite
direction.
Our hypothesis is the following. Because civil wars destroy international
trade, some of the economic gains generated by trade are put at risk for all
groups (rebels and government) involved, so that the opportunity cost of conflict
increases with observed trade flows. From this point of view, a larger openness to
international trade should act as a deterrent to escalation towards civil conflicts.
However, international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during civil
wars as it provides alternative sources of income and consumption. From this
point of view, it can act as an insurance and can reduce the opportunity cost
of civil war. Another way to state this argument is that international trade
can weaken economic ties and dependence between groups and regions inside
a country as trade with foreign countries can become a substitute to internal
trade. This reduced dependence decreases the opportunity cost of conflicts.
This line of reasoning resembles the one made in our previous paper (Martin,
Mayer and Thoenig 2008) showing that multilateral trade openness increases
the probability of a bilateral conflict between countries. In this previous paper,
we showed that violence can arise between two parties because of failure to
avert escalation of a dispute on how to appropriate a surplus. In the presence
of asymmetric information, for example on the military or political strength of
the two parties, the escalation is possible and depends on the opportunity cost
of a violent conflict for both parties. A higher opportunity cost increases the
incentive to make concessions in order to avert escalation. Our hypothesis in
the present paper is that international trade can affect the opportunity cost of
civil conflicts through both deterrence and insurance effects. In order to test for
the existence of these two mechanisms, we first check that more intense conflicts
destroy more trade. Hence, the deterrence effect should be more important for
those conflicts. Also, the insurance effect is weaker for those conflicts. At the
extreme, the insurance effect disappears if all international trade is destroyed
during civil wars.
The initial motivation for civil war as well as its financial feasibility may also
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be related to international trade. This argument has been made for commodity
exports by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007) and Collier, Hoeﬄer and Rohner (2007)
and discussed critically by Fearon (2005). Higher primary commodity exports
can provide opportunities for predation for rebel groups and therefore help fi-
nance the rebelion. They can also constitute a motivation for rebel groups to
capture the rent. The rent extorted from natural resources is most valuable to
the extent that it can be exported. Given that this channel has been extensively
studied in the literature we do not focus on it. But we control for the share of
primary exports over GDP in all our regressions so as to check that the deter-
rence and insurance effects of trade openness on the probability of civil war do
not follow from this feasibility and motivation effect.
In political science, several recent papers (Bussmann and de Soya 2005, Bar-
bieri and Reuveny 2005, Bussmann and Schneider 2007) report a negative cor-
relation between trade openness and the risk of civil war. These studies do not
however take into account the issue of reverse causality. A clear problem is that
the negative correlation may be due to the fact that civil wars durably destroy
trade - something we indeed show and quantify. Hence, a methodological objec-
tive of this paper is to attempt to solve this reverse causality issue with the use
of instruments. Section 2 briefly presents the data used, while section 3 presents
our results on the empirical relation between trade and civil conflicts.
2 Data
The data used in this paper combine several statistical sources. For civil wars,
we mainly use the Correlates Of War source, and more precisely the expanded
version provided by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (http://privatewww.essex.ac.
uk/∼ksg/expwar.html), and detailed in Gleditsch (2004). This dataset also al-
lows to detect the most intense conflicts by providing indication of the number of
battle deaths involved. The median of this figure in the dataset, when positive,
is 30000. We define an intense civil war as involving more than 50000 casualties.
Our typical sample includes all countries available in the civil war dataset over
the 1945-2001 period, where information for right-hand-side variables (in partic-
ular trade) is available. Column (4) of our results table for instance has 4356
observations, of which 4040 exhibit no civil war, 316 (7.2%) have a civil war, and
119 an intense one. For robustness purposes, we also use the expanded version of
the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, used by Gates and Strand (2006).
Regarding intensity, the PRIO dataset is not as precise and only reports when
the number of battle deaths is higher than 1000 which we use as our indicator of
intensity. The PRIO dataset classifies many more events as civil wars. In column
(7), the 4356 observations have 768 (17.6%) civil wars, of which 593 have more
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than 1000 battle deaths.
Other data come from standard sources: Trade uses IMF DOTS data, aug-
mented as in Martin et al. (2008). GDP and population data come mostly from
World Bank WDI, completed by Barbieri (2002). Primary exports ratios are
constructed from the trade dataset of Robert Feenstra1. Democracy comes from
the Polity IV project. Ethnic fractionalization comes from Alesina’s web site.
All gravity related variables come from the CEPII database.
3 Results
3.1 The effect of civil wars on international trade
The first step in our analysis is to quantify the size and persistence of the de-
struction of international trade by civil wars. We do this in a very standard
fashion by estimating gravity equations which measure increases in trade costs
(related to infrastructure, rule of law, information, trust...) due to a civil war.
Note that this effect comes in addition to the impact civil wars have on trade
through their negative impact on income2.
Left in the equation to be estimated is an exporter GDP term, and a vector
of the traditional proxies for trade costs, all expressed relative to the United
States. The list of proxies for trade costs include bilateral distance, contiguity,
colonial linkages, a dummy indicating whether one country has a communist
regime, common membership in a regional trade area and a variable counting
the number of GATT/WTO member in the country pair. To this list we add lags
and leads of dummies indicating the occurrence of a civil war in the importing
or the exporting country. Coefficients on those dummies measure the trade
(exports and imports) impact of such conflicts and the persistence of this impact
over time.
Detailed results are available upon request, and results on usual variables
are very similar to usual findings, with for instance a near unitary coefficient
on incomes, a coefficient near −1 for distance, a positive impact of regional
1As our definition of primary products, we take what has been standard in the literature:
food, beverages, crude materials, fuels, and non-ferrous metals used in the World Bank variable
often used. We add SITC 667, which lists all precious stones, pearls...
2As emphasized by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), all theoretical foundations of the
gravity equation predict bilateral trade flows to be a function of trade partners’ incomes and
bilateral trade impediments, but also of what they call “multilateral resistance terms”, a com-
plex function of incomes and trade costs of all trade partners in a given year. Omitting those
terms biases the estimates of changes in trade costs of the type we want to measure. As in
Martin et al. (2008) and Romalis (2007), we use a convenient feature of CES demand func-
tions that makes relative imports from a given exporter independent of the characteristics of
third countries. Multilateral resistance terms are eliminated in the bilateral trade equation by
choosing the imports from the United States as a benchmark of comparison for all imports of
each importing country. It also eliminates the GDP term of the importing country.
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Figure 1: The impact of civil wars on trade
agreements. For the sake of clarity we choose a graphical representation of our
results of interest. Figure 1 shows, using this regression, the fall in trade after a
civil war relative to “natural” (ie. gravity predicted) trade with 10% confidence
intervals in bands (the coefficients are smoothed using a two years window around
the year of interest). The grey squares represent the impact of the most intense
civil wars (the ones with reported casualties over 50000 deaths), while the black
triangles represent the impact of less severe crises.
The effect of a severe civil war is both very large on contemporaneous trade
and very persistent: we observe a fall in trade around 25% from its natural
level in the first year of the conflict. This controls for the level of GDP (which
typically also falls during civil wars) so that the total fall in trade is actually
larger. The destruction of trade becomes larger with time and is extremely
persistent as it is still present at around 40% 25 years after the conflict’s onset.
This is in contrast with inter-state wars where the effect is large when looking
at bilateral trade between the two belligerents but is not as persistent and is
very small for multilateral trade of two belligerents (Blomberg and Hess 2006;
Martin et al. 2008). For less severe conflicts, the effect is smaller but still present
and persistent. It however disappears after around 20 years. Interestingly, the
4
fall in trade anticipates the onset of the civil war. Many explanations can be
given to this finding but it points clearly to an endogeneity issue in previous
empirical studies that have found a negative impact of trade on the risk of civil
wars (Bussmann and de Soya 2005, Barbieri and Reuveny 2005).
3.2 The impact of trade openness on the risk of civil war
We now analyze the impact of trade openness on the probability of civil war
and attempt to identify the two effects we discussed in the introduction: deter-
rence and insurance. Because the deterrence effect depends positively on the
expected destruction of trade, we can infer from the previous section results that
deterrence is stronger in the case of the most severe civil wars. Hence our em-
pirical strategy consists in disentangling the deterrence and insurance effects by
comparing the differential effect of trade openness on low vs high intensity civil
wars. We estimate the probability of a civil war in country i at time t with the
following regression:
Pr(warit) = γ0 + γ1controlsit + (γ2 + γ3intensityit)× ln
 R∑
j 6=i
mijt
Eit
 , (1)
where
(
R∑
j 6=i
mijt/Eit
)
represents multilateral import flows as ratios of income
and intensityit is a dummy variable equal to one for high intensity civil wars.
The presence of an insurance mechanism in trade is consistent with a positive
impact of trade on the probability of civil war so we expect γ2 > 0. The presence
of a deterrence effect is identified by a negative effect of trade openness on the
wars that are most destructive in terms of trade, i.e. the high intensity wars.
Hence, we expect: γ3 < 0.
Table 1 shows both the pooled results (first two columns) and the fixed effects
results (last six columns). The interaction term γ3 featuring in equation 1 is
tested in regressions (5) to (8).
In regressions (1) to (4), we replicate some of the results obtained in the
existing literature. In regression (1), we use a logit specification predicting the
onset of civil wars for the 1960-1999 period. We introduce a number of standard
controls: The number of peaceful years (since the last civil war); the growth
rate of the country at time t − 2, the log of the GDP per capita at t − 1, the
log of population at time t− 1, the log of the share of primary exports in GDP,
the index of democracy and its squared value and finally an index of ethnic
fractionalization. In all regressions, decade fixed effects are added.3 The first
3The introduction of five year fixed effects does not change the results qualitatively. Year
fixed effects leave signs unchanged but reduce the significance of some coefficients.
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two columns therefore pool a very large number of countries over roughly half
a century each. The error term is thus likely to exhibit correlation patterns
for a given country, and we cluster the (robust) standard errors at the country
level to take this into account. The controls have the usual sign (see Fearon
2005 for a comparable specification) but their significance is lower than in the
existing literature because of clustered standard errors. In this first regression,
the correlation between the probability of civil war and trade openness is negative
and very significant as in the existing literature. However, this coefficient is
difficult to interpret due to the reverse causality issue discussed in the previous
section. The second regression has similar results for a logit equation that has
all years of civil wars (and not only the onset of it). From regression (3), we
systematically introduce country fixed effects in our specifications4. In the logit
version of column (3), the identification of the country fixed effects is made only
within countries that experienced a civil war at some point in our time frame:
This means that all countries that never experienced a civil war are dropped
from the sample. We thus choose to switch to OLS regressions with fixed effects
as this less stringent specification allows to retain all observations. As shown
in column (4), the OLS results are very similar to the logit ones: in both cases
trade openness is not significant and, for the other covariates, the direction and
the significance of the effects are similar.
Starting with regression (5), equation 1 is tested and we attempt to identify
the two effects of trade openness by introducing an interaction term between
trade openness and the intensity of the civil war. The results are consistent with
our hypothesis that trade openness affects the probability of a civil war through
both an insurance and a deterrence effect. For low intensity civil wars, trade
openness increases the probability of a civil war. However, for high intensity ones,
trade openness reduces the risk of civil war as the coefficient on the interacted
term is larger (in absolute value) than the non interacted one. In regression (5),
the hypothesis is tested with a fixed effects OLS specification. Both coefficients
are significant and of the right sign. We have checked that using only observations
for the onset of civil wars gives similar results. A possible alternative explanation
of the positive sign on trade openness is that it helps finance or motivate the
rebelion. Remember however that we control for the share of primary exports
in GDP. Hence, this suggests that the positive sign on trade openness for low
intensity conflicts does not come from the fact that higher exports of primary
commodities facilitate the financing of rebelion.
In regression (6), we attempt to solve the endogeneity issue by using instru-
mental variables. Given that we have two endogenous variables (trade and trade
4In this case, ethnic fractionalization which is not time varying is dropped.
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interacted with war intensity), we need to use at least two instrumental variables.
We choose the log of remoteness of the country and a dummy for membership
of the country in GATT/WTO. Both variables are lagged two years so as to
give them time to affect trade openness. The remoteness variable is routinely
used in the international trade literature as one of the determinants of trade
flows (see Baier and Bergstrand 2004) and as an instrument for trade open-
ness. Intuitively, remoteness measures each importers set of alternative trade
partners. A country with low remoteness has many nearby and large alternative
sources of goods and increases its multilateral imports and is therefore more open
to trade. Following the literature, our definition of the remoteness variable is:
remotenessit = − ln
(∑R
j 6=iGDPjt/dij
)
, where dij is bilateral distance between i
and j. The main interest of the remoteness variable is that it varies in the time
dimension for a given country i - this is a key feature given that our regressions
include country fixed effects. First stage regressions (unreported due to space
constraints but available upon request) show that our two instruments have the
expected effects on trade openness (negative for remoteness and positive for
GATT/WTO membership) for both the COW and PRIO datasets. The F-tests
statistics lie around 80 indicating very powerful instruments. Unsurprisingly, the
instruments are weaker when explaining trade openness interacted with civil war
intensity. In fact, only GATT/WTO membership seems a significant covariate
in this case, strongly for the COW civil wars, weaker in the case of PRIO.
Regression (6) is our preferred specification (instrumental variables, country
fixed effects, decade fixed effects). The two coefficients of interest, γ2 and γ3
in equation 1, have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level. In
regression (7) and (8), we check whether our results also hold when we use the
PRIO data set. Broadly the results are confirmed. However, in the specification
with instrumental variables (regression 8), the interaction term, although it has
the right sign, is not significant. This is very likely to come from the fact that
in this data set, none of our instruments is very strong for the interaction term.
4 Conclusion
We find support for the hypothesis that trade openness of a country affects its
risk of civil war. Trade openness increases the risk of low intensity conflicts but
decreases the risk of high intensity conflicts. We interpret this result as evidence
that international trade affects the risk of civil war through two mechanisms that
play in opposite direction: insurance and deterrence.
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